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SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria — Attestix coverage

How Attestix's signed audit chains, Verifiable Credentials, and provenance records map to the AICPA SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (2017 + 2022 additions). SOC 2 is an attestation, not a certification — Attestix is evidence plumbing your CPA's auditor can use, not a SOC 2 readiness platform.

The AICPA SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (TSC 2017 with 2022 Revised Points of Focus) are the framework an independent CPA firm uses to perform a SOC 2 examination of a service organisation. This page shows how Attestix's signed audit chains, Verifiable Credentials, and provenance records map to the TSC — focused on the technology-heavy criteria (Common Criteria CC1-CC9 and Processing Integrity PI1) where chain-hashed evidence is most useful.

Why this matters

SOC 2 is an attestation, not a certification. This distinction is load-bearing:

  • A certification (ISO 27001, ISO 42001) is a binary YES/NO awarded by an accredited certification body. The organisation displays a cert mark.
  • An attestation (SOC 2) is a CPA firm's professional opinion on whether the service organisation's controls were suitably designed (Type I) or designed and operating effectively (Type II) to meet the relevant Trust Services Criteria over a stated audit period. The deliverable is a SOC 2 report (~80-200 pages) with a one-page CPA opinion letter on top.

Attestix does not ship SOC 2 attestations and is not a CPA firm. We do not issue an opinion. What Attestix ships is the evidence plumbing your CPA's auditor can use during your own SOC 2 examination — particularly for the technology-heavy criteria where signed audit trails + chain-hashed event logs + cryptographic identity reduce auditor evidence-gathering by weeks.

The honest coverage table

The TSC 2017 has 64 criteria total. The table below covers 30 representative criteria focused on Common Criteria (CC1-CC9, the Security category required for every SOC 2 report) and Processing Integrity (PI1, the entire category — the strongest Attestix-aligned area).

CriterionMitigation surface in AttestixCoverageEvidence shape
CC1.1 Integrity + ethical values commitmentNone directly; ethics culture is organisationalrecord-onlyProviderAssertionCredential
CC1.2-CC1.5 Board oversight + structures + competency + accountabilityNone; organisational controlsout-of-scope
CC2.1-CC2.3 Information quality + internal + external communicationEvery audit event high-quality by construction; agent cards + DoC as external-communication artefactsevidence-substrateAgentIdentityCredential + audit chain
CC3.1 Specifies objectivesintended_purpose + system_objectives (v0.5)record-onlyProviderAssertionCredential
CC3.2 Identifies + analyses risk (includes 2022 AI/ML points of focus)v0.5 risk register + cross-walk to OWASP ASI + FRIA templateevidence-substrateProviderAssertionCredential + SecurityCheckCredential
CC3.3 Considers fraud riskChain-hashed audit log makes post-hoc fraud forensically detectable (actors with valid DID credentials can still emit fraudulent-but-hash-consistent events — pair with CC7.2 anomaly detection); cross-walk to OWASP ASI03 (identity abuse)evidence-substrateProviderAssertionCredential + audit-chain tamper-evidence
CC4.1-CC4.2 Ongoing + separate evaluations + deficiency communicationcompliance_service checks re-run on cron with signed VerifiableCheckResult; v0.5 control_deficiency eventsevidence-substrateVerifiableCheckResult + audit chain
CC5.1-CC5.3 Control activity selection + general technology controls + deployment via policiescompliance_service profiles encode control selections; audit chain over every profile changerecord-onlyProviderAssertionCredential + audit chain
CC6.1 Logical access security software + infrastructureDID-based identity; UCAN capability + scope enforcement; every state change signed by actor DIDevidence-substrateDID document + UCAN token + audit chain
CC6.2 Registers + authorises new users prior to credential issuanceidentity_service.create_agent_identity — signed + dated + role-tagged; approver DID signs issuance eventevidence-substrateAgentIdentityCredential + approver-signed audit event
CC6.3 Authorises + modifies + removes access (least privilege + segregation of duties)UCAN delegation chain (least-privilege built in via attenuation — no chain can grant powers the parent did not have, PR #45); revoke_credentialevidence-substrate (strongest CC6 row)UCAN chain + revocation VC + audit chain
CC6.4-CC6.5 Physical access + asset retrieval/disposalNone directly; data-centre operations (AWS, GCP, Azure, on-prem)out-of-scope
CC6.6 Logical security measures against threats outside system boundaryCross-walk to OWASP ASI03 + ASI07; offline verify_credential for external-actor authenticationevidence-substrateAudit chain + SecurityCheckCredential
CC6.7 Transmission + movement + removal of informationbundle export signed + chain-hashed; v0.5 data_egress eventsevidence-substrateAudit chain + signed bundle manifest
CC6.8 Prevention + detection of unauthorised or malicious softwareCross-walk to OWASP ASI04 supply chain; model-lineage + training-data fingerprintsevidence-substrateProvenance entries + SecurityCheckCredential (ASI04 tag)
CC7.1 Detection + monitoring procedures (config changes + vulnerabilities)v0.5 config_change events with before/after; cross-walk to Art 15.5 cybersec checkevidence-substrateAudit chain + VerifiableCheckResult
CC7.2 Monitors system components for anomaliesCross-walk to NIST AI RMF MANAGE-4.1; reputation drift; v0.5 incident-reporting collectionevidence-substrateHash-chained audit + ReputationScoreCredential + IncidentReportCredential
CC7.3 Evaluates security events; initiates responsev0.5 incident-reporting collection (Art 73 cross-walk); revocation as kill-switchevidence-substrateIncidentReportCredential + revocation VC + audit chain
CC7.4 Executes defined incident-response programmeSame surface as CC7.3 + cross-walk to ISO 42001 A.8.4evidence-substrateIncidentReportCredential + audit chain
CC7.5 Recovers from identified incidentsv0.5 recovery_event; re-issued credentials post-recovery signed + chain-hashedevidence-substrateAudit chain + re-issued credential VCs
CC8.1 Change management (authorise + design + develop + configure + document + test + approve + implement)record_action(entry_type="change_request", before, after, approver_did); model-lineage changes; profile audit chainevidence-substrate (strong — change-management evidence is exactly what chain-hashed event logs are for)Audit chain + provenance entries
CC9.1 Risk-mitigation activities for potential business disruptionsSame surface as CC3.2 + CC7.5evidence-substrateProviderAssertionCredential + audit chain
CC9.2 Vendor + business-partner risk (includes 2022 AI/ML points of focus)Cross-walk to NIST AI RMF MAP-3.4 + OWASP ASI04; third-party AgentIdentityCredential acceptanceevidence-substrateAgentIdentityCredential + UCAN delegation + audit chain
PI1.1 Processing objectives + data definitions + product/service specsintended_purpose + system_specifications (v0.5); signed agent card with data-schema declarationsevidence-substrateAgentIdentityCredential + ProviderAssertionCredential
PI1.2 Input completeness + accuracy controlsv0.5 Art 15 accuracy/robustness check evidence; input_validation eventsevidence-substrateAudit chain + VerifiableCheckResult
PI1.3 System-processing controlsEvery state change signed + chain-hashed — processing integrity is forensic by construction; verify_chain tamper-evidenceevidence-substrate (strongest PI row)Audit chain + verify_chain result
PI1.4 Output completeness + accuracy + timelinessoutput_delivered events + bundle-export integrityevidence-substrateAudit chain + bundle manifest
PI1.5 Storage of inputs + items in processing + outputsStorage chain-hashed by construction; bundle export = portable storage receiptevidence-substrateAudit chain + bundle
A1.1-A1.3 Capacity + system backup + environmental monitoringNone directly; platform-operations (AWS/GCP/Azure/on-prem)record-onlyProviderAssertionCredential
C1.1-C1.2, P1.1 Confidentiality + privacy notice + retentionCross-walk to GDPR Art 17 (already in v0.3.0); privacy notice as ProviderAssertionCredentialpartialProviderAssertionCredential + audit chain

Tally (across all 64 criteria)

  • evidence-substrate (Attestix produces signed evidence your auditor can examine): 27
  • record-only (Attestix signs your operator's assertions): 18
  • out-of-scope (organisational + cultural CC1 + physical CC6.4-CC6.5 + most of Privacy P1-P8 territory): 19

Concentrated where it matters most for SOC 2: Security CC6 (logical access — UCAN + DID), CC7 (system operations — chain-hashed events), CC8 (change management — provenance) and Processing Integrity PI1 (the entire category).

Important caveat — security_check_id ships in v0.5.0. As of Attestix v0.4.0 the underlying events are emitted today, but they are NOT yet tagged with the soc2.* discriminator. The v0.5.0 release registers the prefix in FRAMEWORK_REGISTRY; per-criterion emission tagging is incremental.

What we don't do

  • We do not issue SOC 2 reports. The CPA firm performing your examination is the only entity that issues SOC 2 reports.
  • We do not author your policies. Policy authorship lives in your DMS, with Vanta / Drata / Secureframe templates, or with internal counsel.
  • We do not shepherd your SOC 2 readiness end-to-end. That is what compliance platforms (Vanta, Drata, Secureframe, Strike Graph, AuditBoard) do — auditor coordination, employee training, evidence collection workflows, continuous monitoring dashboards. They sit above the evidence layer; we sit below. The two stack.
  • We do not do physical security (CC6.4-CC6.5). Your data-centre operator's SOC 2 carve-out covers that.
  • We are not your IAM enforcement layer. We record who attempted what; your Okta / Auth0 / Entra IAM enforces access policies.
  • We are not your SIEM. We produce signed forensic evidence; your Splunk / Datadog / Honeycomb ingests + dashboards.

How to verify our coverage yourself

Python / CLI

# List every audit event tagged with a SOC 2 criterion (v0.5.0+)
attestix audit list --security-check soc2.security.CC6_3.access_granted

# Export a bundle scoped to SOC 2 evidence for your auditor (v0.5.0+)
attestix bundle export --controls soc2 --out my-soc2-evidence.atxbundle

# Verify chain integrity for an agent's audit log (today)
attestix verify-chain <agent-did>

JavaScript / browser

npm install attestix
import { verifyCredential } from "attestix";

const result = await verifyCredential(securityCheckCredentialJson);
// result.valid === true if the Ed25519 signature over the JCS-canonical body
// matches the issuer DID's public key.

On-chain anchor (Base L2 Sepolia testnet)

attestix anchor audit-batch --agent <did> --network base-sepolia

Mainnet schema registration is planned; testnet is the default target today.

Comparable disclosure

How other tools position themselves on SOC 2.

ToolStated SOC 2 positionWhere to read more
Microsoft Agent Governance ToolkitPublishes docs/compliance/soc2-mapping.md; CloudEvents-to-Azure-Monitor as evidence pathgithub.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit
VantaEnd-to-end SOC 2 readiness platform — auditor coordination + policy templates + employee training + continuous monitoring + evidence collection. Slots above Attestix as the GRC layervanta.com
DrataSame posture as Vantadrata.com
SecureframeSame posture as Vanta + Dratasecureframe.com
Strike GraphSame posture; mid-market focusedstrikegraph.com
AuditBoardEnterprise GRC including SOC 2 module; same postureauditboard.com
CPA firms (Coalfire, Schellman, A-LIGN, Sensiba, etc.)The actual SOC 2 examination performers. Attestix is evidence input to their auditAICPA SOC 2 firm directory

See also


Attestix is evidence tooling a customer's auditor can use during the customer's own SOC 2 examination. Attestix does not issue SOC 2 attestations, is not a CPA firm, and a passing tag against a Trust Services Criterion is one signal among many in the audit — the auditor's professional opinion is the authoritative output. Compliance platforms like Vanta, Drata, Secureframe, and Strike Graph shepherd the end-to-end SOC 2 readiness journey; we slot underneath them as the cryptographic evidence layer.