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OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (2025-2026) — Attestix coverage

How each of the OWASP Top 10 risks for Agentic Applications (ASI01-ASI10) maps to Attestix's audit, identity, and credential primitives. Honest per-risk coverage with concrete evidence shapes — not marketing-spec "10/10".

The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 was published by the OWASP GenAI Security Project on 9 December 2025. It names the ten most critical security risks facing autonomous AI agents: ASI01 through ASI10. This page shows how Attestix maps each risk to a concrete, signed evidence shape that an auditor, regulator, or insurer can verify offline.

Why this matters

Plenty of frameworks claim "10/10 coverage" of OWASP lists. Attestix's claim is narrower and (we think) more useful: for every ASI risk, we point at a specific signed artefact — a W3C Verifiable Credential, a hash-chained audit event, or an on-chain anchor — that constitutes evidence relevant to that risk. We do not replace runtime guardrails (NeMo Guardrails, llm-guard, Guardrails AI, promptfoo). We are the forensic substrate that records what those guardrails decided and produces evidence a third party can verify without trusting our infrastructure.

The honest coverage table

RiskMitigation surface in AttestixCoverageEvidence shapeWhere to verify
ASI01:2026 Agent Goal Hijack — "Attackers manipulate agent goals, plans, or decision paths through direct or indirect instruction injection, causing agents to pursue unintended or malicious objectives."UCAN delegation chains bound agent capability; verify_delegation flags actions outside scope; compliance_profile.intended_purpose provides a comparison baselinestrong-partialAudit event + SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5)attestix verify-delegation <chain> / verifyCredential() in @vibetensor/attestix
ASI02:2026 Tool Misuse & Exploitation — "Agents misuse or abuse tools through unsafe composition, recursion, or excessive execution, causing harmful side effects despite having valid permissions."Every MCP tool invocation emits a chain-hashed audit event with actor + action + target_id; provenance log records every external callpartialPer-call AuditEvent (chain-hashed)attestix audit list --tag owasp.asi.ASI02 (v0.5 CLI flag)
ASI03:2026 Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse — "Delegated authority, ambiguous agent identity, or trust assumptions lead to unauthorized actions through impersonation or privilege escalation."DID-based agent identity (did:key, did:web); UCAN v0.9 with parent-token verification + capability attenuation; revocation as a signed VCfullDID document, UCAN tokens, audit event, SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5)Offline verification walkthrough
ASI04:2026 Agentic Supply Chain Compromise — "External agents, tools, schemas, or prompts that agents dynamically trust or import become compromised, introducing malicious components."record_model_lineage + record_training_data produce signed provenance entries; agent cards carry signed identity + capability declarations; OMS-compatible signatures planned (v0.5)strong-partialProvenance entries (signed, hash-chained), AgentIdentityCredentialattestix verify-provenance <agent-id>
ASI05:2026 Unexpected Code Execution — "Agent-generated or agent-triggered code executes without sufficient validation or isolation, enabling unauthorized system access."Provenance log records every external-call entry the agent self-reports; v0.5 Article 15.4 check records the provider's sandbox-isolation declarationrecord-onlyProvenance entry + SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5, sandbox declaration only)attestix audit list --action external_call
ASI06:2026 Memory & Context Poisoning — "Injection or leakage of agent memory or contextual state influences future reasoning or actions across sessions."Per-agent hash-chained memory log; verify_chain detects any post-hoc tampering; the chain itself IS the tamper-evidencestrong-partialHash-chained provenance entries; verify_chain returns VerifyChainResult with structured failure pointerattestix verify-chain <agent-id> / verify in the browser via the NPM package
ASI07:2026 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication — "Messages exchanged between agents, planners, and executors become manipulated through interception, injection, or spoofing."InteractionCredential (W3C VC) wraps inter-agent messages with sender DID signature; agent cards published for capability discovery; offline verify_credential confirms authenticitystrong-partialInteractionCredential (W3C VC, Ed25519-signed); optional Base L2 Sepolia anchorattestix verify-credential <vc.json> / verifyCredential() in JS
ASI08:2026 Cascading Agent Failures — "Small agent failures propagate through connected systems, causing large-scale impact via tool chains or resource exhaustion."Cross-agent causal links (v0.5 optional causal_parent_event_id field on record_action); per-agent audit chain enables post-mortem reconstruction; v0.5 incident-reporting collectionrecord-onlyPer-agent audit chain + IncidentReportCredential (v0.5)attestix bundle export --include-incidents for offline reconstruction
ASI09:2026 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation — "Human over-reliance on agents is exploited through misleading explanations, authority misrepresentation, or false certainty."EU AI Act Article 14 (human oversight) checks in v0.5; ProviderAssertionCredential separates "system-verified" (green) from "provider-asserted" (blue) terminal states — by design we never auto-promote an assertion to verificationstrong-partialVerifiableCheckResult for Art 14 checks + ProviderAssertionCredential for human assertionsattestix verify-check <result-id>
ASI10:2026 Rogue Agents — "Agents act beyond intended objectives due to goal drift, collusion, reward hacking, or exceeding designed autonomy boundaries."revoke_identity + revoke_credential as operator kill-switch (signed VC); UCAN expiry + attenuation bound blast radius; reputation-score downward drift detectable; v0.5 Art 14.4 stop-button declarationstrong-partialRevocation VC, expired UCAN, ReputationScoreCredential, VerifiableCheckResultattestix revoke <id> produces a signed revocation event verifiable via the public chain anchor

OWASP source for every quoted description above: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026.

Tally

  • full: 1 (ASI03)
  • strong-partial: 6 (ASI01, ASI04, ASI06, ASI07, ASI09, ASI10)
  • partial: 1 (ASI02)
  • record-only: 2 (ASI05, ASI08)
  • out-of-scope: 0

We do not claim "10/10 mitigated". We claim 10/10 mapped to a concrete signed evidence shape. The difference matters — see What we don't do below.

Important caveat — security_check_id ships in v0.5.0. As of Attestix v0.4.0 (May 2026) the underlying events listed above are emitted today, but they are NOT yet tagged with the namespaced security_check_id discriminator. The v0.5.0 release adds the field, the SecurityCheckCredential sidecar VC, and the attestix audit --security-check owasp.asi.ASI<NN> CLI filter. Until then you can already query the underlying events by action and reconstruct the same coverage manually.

What we don't do

The following are intentional non-goals. The most honest section of any security framework is the gap statement.

  • No runtime prompt-injection detection. ASI01 (Goal Hijack) is mitigated after the fact by delegation-scope bounding and forensic replay; we do not analyse prompts in real time. Pair Attestix with NeMo Guardrails, Guardrails AI, llm-guard, or promptfoo for the runtime layer and let Attestix sign the evidence those tools produce.
  • No code sandbox. ASI05 (Code Execution) is record-only because executing code safely is the host runtime's job (Docker, gVisor, Firecracker, language-level sandboxes). We record what was executed, by whom, and when — so post-incident forensics can attribute responsibility — but we do not block the call.
  • No real-time cascade detection. ASI08 (Cascading Failures) is observability (Datadog, Honeycomb, OpenTelemetry traces); cascade evidence is compliance (us). Operators detect cascades via their existing monitoring; Attestix produces the bundle export that reconstructs which agent touched what in what order.
  • No hallucination detector. We do not score the truthfulness of LLM output. We sign what the agent did; downstream forensics catches drift against the declared intended_purpose.
  • No assertion-to-verification promotion. Per the v0.5 anti-compliance-theater design: when a human asserts "yes, the residual risk is acceptable" or "yes, accuracy metrics are documented", the result transitions to the terminal state assertion_recorded (rendered as a blue chip), NOT to passed=true (rendered green). Attestix never claims to have verified the substance of a human assertion.

How to verify our coverage yourself

Python / CLI

# List every audit event tagged with an OWASP ASI risk (v0.5.0+)
attestix audit list --security-check owasp.asi.ASI08

# Verify the chain integrity for an agent's audit log
attestix verify-chain <agent-did>

# Export a bundle including SecurityCheckCredentials (v0.5.0+)
attestix bundle export --include-security-credentials --out my-agent.atxbundle

JavaScript / browser

npm install @vibetensor/attestix
import { verifyCredential } from "@vibetensor/attestix";

const result = await verifyCredential(securityCheckCredentialJson);
// result.valid === true if the Ed25519 signature over the JCS-canonical body
// matches the issuer DID's public key. No network calls; the DID is self-resolving
// (did:key) or fetched once and cached (did:web).

The NPM package is Apache-2.0 licensed, runs in Node 18+ and modern browsers, depends only on @noble/curves, and ships with TypeScript types. A regulator with no Attestix install can verify any Attestix-issued credential by npm install-ing a 68.9 KB package.

On-chain anchor (Base L2 Sepolia testnet)

Tamper-evidence for the chain-of-evidence itself. See the Base L2 testnet anchor walkthrough.

attestix anchor audit-batch --agent <did> --network base-sepolia

Mainnet schema registration is planned; testnet is the default target today.

Comparable disclosure

How other tools position themselves on agentic-AI security. We name approaches we found through public documentation; we do not disparage and we welcome corrections.

ToolStated agentic-security positionWhere to read more
Microsoft Agent Governance ToolkitAdvertises 10/10 OWASP Agentic Top 10 coverage via policy-template attestation; emits CloudEvents to Azure Monitor; SPIFFE-style identity. Closest competitor by breadth.github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit
airblackbox51 EU AI Act Article 9-15 checks with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204 post-quantum) signing; library-only, offline verify.py. Strong on article-level depth; does not map to OWASP ASI explicitly.github.com/airblackbox/airblackbox
NeMo Guardrails / Guardrails AI / llm-guardRuntime LLM-output safety rails. Complementary to Attestix — they decide; we sign the decision.github.com/NVIDIA/NeMo-Guardrails, guardrailsai.com, github.com/protectai/llm-guard
promptfoo / garakLLM red-teaming + eval frameworks. Useful for ASI01/ASI06 pre-deployment hardening; do not produce signed compliance evidence.promptfoo.dev, github.com/leondz/garak
sigstore / OpenSSF Model SigningThe de-facto signing layer for AI model artefacts. Attestix wraps OMS-compatible signatures on record_model_lineage (planned v0.5) rather than competing.openssf.org/projects/model-signing

See also